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Introduction
Community-driven development (CDD) has become increasingly common approach used 
by mul-tilateral development banks, governments, and NGOs to address the needs of the 
poor local communities in developing countries. CDD is characterized by the approach of 
giving control of decision and resources to the local community. CDD approaches are 
particularly prominent in conflict-affected communities which enables local community to 
regain sense of social cohesion and to restore livelihood. While much of literature focused 
on documenting the challenges and benefits of CDD approach in conflict affected context, 
what is yet to be established is whether CDD in conflict affected context can generate 
change in social and economic outcomes.
Thus, this paper explores whether or not community-driven development (CDD) project 
af-fects a villages social capital and economic outcomes in post-conflict Cambodia. We 
compare the impact of CDD by looking at data from two rounds of surveys (baseline and 
endline). The results indicate that the project significantly strengthens the capacity of 
self-reliance, especially in vulnerable groups such as low-income, less educated and ethnic 
and religious minority house-holds. However, CDD was shown to have very limited impact 
on improving economic condition. Although the project slightly increases the household 
monthly income, the CDD project does not generate remarkable changes in community-level 
economic conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the historical background of 
Cambodia and the unique features of this CDD project. Section 3 describes the intervention 
and data collec-tion. Section 4 outlines the estimation models used in the analysis. In 
Section 5, we present the results of the program and explain their implications.
Syngjoo Choi, Hye-Ryoung Jung, Booyuel Kim, Taejong Kim, Hee-Seung Yang
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Background
Cambodia has recently stepped into the lower-middle income stage through strong 
economic growth. However, poverty continues to fall in Cambodia. According to the World 
Bank, about 90% of the poor live in rural areas while agriculture remains the traditional 
mainstay of the Cambodian economy comprising about 30% of the GDP and absorbing 
almost half of the total labor force. Moreover, the wide spread devastation under Pol Pot 
regime in 1970s is assumed to have persistent impact on social capital in Cambodia.
Between 1975 to 1979, Khmer Rouge Party leader Pol Pot attempted to impose 
extreme form of Maoist Communist agriculture model in Cambodia. The regime forced 
millions of people to labor camps where they had to work long hours a day, with limited 
food and no compensation
(Chandler, 2000). Anyone who was perceived as potential threat to the regime 
including all the intellectuals and elites, were tortured and killed. In just less than four 
years of the Khmer Rouge regime, it is estimated that 25 percent of the Cambodias total 
population (nearly 2 million people) were killed. The widespread atrocities committed by 
the Khmer Rouge made it difficult for country to recover, as the regime resulted depleting 
social capitals as well as destroying all social, political and economic institutions (Collier 
et al., 2003).
In this context, Cambodian government showed interest in the Saemaul Undong (SMU), 
which was the Korean rural development program in the 1970s. It contributed to seasonal 
poverty elim-ination in the rural area and alleviation of urban-rural disparity through 
village-level projects. Recently it has received global attention and has been launched in 
many developing countries. The Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) of Cambodia and 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) signed to implement the pilot SMU in 
30 villages from 2014 to 2018. Saemaul Undong, literally translated as new village 
movement, was a rural community development pro-gram in the early 1970s. Saemaul 
Undong stands out from other rural CDD projects in mainly two facets. First, rural 
villagers participation was pivotal in successful implementation of a wide-scale community 
project. Rural villagers contributed to their villages development goal in the form of labor, 
cash, land and other materials, and these participation and contribution was key to Saemaul 
Undongs success.
The Cambodia SMU project allows villagers to formulate a village-level yearly plan 
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and are granted funds to implement their plan. Based on their performance evaluation in 
the previous year, each village will receive different amount of fund in the subsequent 
year to implement another yearly plan. The Cambodia SMU has multiple objectives: to 
improve the livelihood of ru-ral villages through income generation, capacity building, and 
living environment improvement activities, and strengthen social cohesion.
Cambodia SMU differs from existing rural CDD project in mainly two aspects. First, 
Cambo-dia SMU integrates both top-down and bottom-up approaches. The central 
government provides the general introduction of project guidelines and directions, while the 
local government act as a pipeline to link the voices of both village and the central 
government. And at the community-level, each village proposes and implements its own 
development project plan. Like many other CDD projects, the Cambodia SMU also builds 
on villagers active participation to strengthen own-ership and sustainability.
Setting
The Saemaul Undong Project (SMU) in Cambodia is a four-year project (2014-2018), 
implemented in 30 villages in 3 Provinces. The impact evaluation team contracted with 
Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), a local Cambodia research team, to conduct the 
baseline survey, which took place from February to April 2017. Due to the delay in 
impact evaluation design and survey firm contracting, the data collection began later than 
expected and the project implementation had begun by the time of the data collection. The 
baseline survey took place in three Provinces (Kampong Speu, Takeo, and Tboung 
Khmum) in Cambodia, and 1,800 households were sampled in the 30 treatment villages 
and 30 control villages – approximately 30 households for each village. RUPP used 
systematic sampling technique to select households for the baseline survey. Each household 
had an equal chance to be selected for the study from the ordered sampling frame. The 
endline survey was conducted from July to September in 2019 after the SMU ended. The 
endline survey included 56 households for each village, except Ek Pheap where sample 
size is 51 out of total 72 households.
The sampled households were asked about (i) household demographics; (ii) household 
socioe-conomic status; (iii) access to services; (iv) community groups; (v) trust; (vi) social 
cohesion ; (vii) effect of pol pot regime. The questionnaires were developed and pre-tested 
in Khmer languages, and enumerators were trained in collecting and recording the required 
6
information. The ques-tionnaire was first developed by the impact evaluation team and then 
reviewed and translated into Khmer language by the RUPP team. Social capital related 
questions were designed based on Measuring Social Capital of the World Bank (2004). 
The questionnaire was tested and piloted in other areas of Cambodia to ensure it was 
culturally appropriate. During the enumerator training and pilot surveys, some questions 
were refined because they were not clear for respondents and data collections.
Figure 1 presents geographical information of treatment and control villages, and the 
location of genocide burials. The black polygon indicates the boundary of district, the red 
dots are burial sites, the blue dots and yellow dots are the households belonging to 
treatment group and control group respectively. As shown in Cambodia map (left above), 
the SMU was implemented in the villages that were largely harmed by the genocide to 
assess the impact of Pol Pot experience on the results of SMU. The right below map that 
enlarges the site of intervention presents the locations of households of both groups. As 
shown in the right below map, to prevent contagion effect, households in the control 
village are selected to have at least over 5 km distance from those in treatment village.
Figure 1: Burials of Genocide, Treatment and Control Groups
Notes: The genocide data is from Cambodia Genocide Databases 
(https://gsp.yale.edu/cambodian-genocide-databases-cgdb).
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Empirical Analysis
Identification Strategy
To rigorously evaluate the effects of SMU program in a causal way, a randomized 
experiment was required before the program. However, Cambodias SMU program had 
already started with the endogenous selection of 30 treatment villages. To compensate for 
the limitation of the non-randomized treatment, we use differences-in-differences estimation 
to control for the initial differ-ences derived from time-consistent omitted variables between 
the treatment and control villages.
Outcomehvdt = βTreatmentvd × Postdt + γTreatmentvd + δPostdt + Xhvdtθ + λd + εhvdt  (1)
where Outcomehvd is an outcome of interest of household h in village v and 
district d at time
a. Treatment is a dummy for SMU program participation and Time is a dummy 
equal to 1 for the endline. Xhvdt is a set of vectors controlling for baseline 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. λd is the district fixed effects that 
address all the unobservable but time-constant features of district. εhvdt is an error 
term. β is our coefficient of interest capturing the average treatment effects of SMU 
program after controlling for the initial differences between the treat-ment and control 
villages. This double difference estimation strategy is effective to weed out 
time-invariant village specific compounding factors as well as to control for general 
time trend applying for the entire villages.
Results
Baseline Estimates
A balance test was done to ensure that the assignment of treatment is orthogonal to 
other char-acteristics of the sample. The sample comprises 1,805 households in total: 911 
from 30 treatment villages and 904 from 30 control villages. Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics of household characteristics of each group. We compare the demographic 
characteristics of households in treatment villages with those of control villages. As column 
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(6) of Table 1 presents, the treatment and control groups are not similar in the cultural 
composition: religion, ethnicity, and economic status measured by land and home 
ownership. Though these unbalanced characteristics might bias the estimates of SMU 
impact in simple regression, these time-consistent confounding factors can be addressed 
with the difference in difference strategy. Moreover, to minimize any possible effect 
predetermined demographic features, we include the characteristics that were significantly 
different between treated and control village groups as control variables.















Age 52.112 911 51.599 904 0.513 0.414
Female 0.27 904 0.259 894 0.011 0.58
Buddhism 0.836 911 0.979 904 -0.143*** 0
Khmer 0.838 911 0.985 904 -0.147*** 0
Marital status 0.775 911 0.793 904 -0.018 0.347
Education year 3.049 911 3.299 904 -0.25* 0.091
Land ownership 0.936 911 0.904 904 0.033** 0.011
Home ownership 0.897 911 0.861 904 0.036** 0.018
Weighted assets 12.582 911 13.43 903 -0.849 0.255
Pol Pot trauma 4.792 911 5.022 904 -0.231 0.119
Notes: The sample includes total 1,805 households from 60 villages in Cambodia. The households whose 
geographical information of residence are different from the administrative boundary of village are included 
but the test that excluded these household generates the same results. The differences of household 
characteristics between treatment and control villages are measured by t-test. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the village level are presented in parentheses. Sig-nificantly different than zero is indicated at 
99 (***), 95 (**), and 90(*) percent confidence. Reported weighted average of assets are estimated by 
inverse average of 11 household assests including car, mobile phone, wire phone, boat, bed, sofa, radio, 
television, refrigerator, bicycle, motorbicycle and electricity. ’Physically (mentally) affected by the Pol Pot 
regimes’ is coded by 6 likert scales: zero to five. For the ones with no exposure to the regime is coded 
zero while five is for the ones who were severely (physically or mentally) injured during the Pol Pot 
regime.
SMU effect on Social Capital
1. Trust in villagers
This evaluation measures the impact of SMU on social capital through its three pillars: 
trust, self-empowerment and collective action. We present the treatment effects of SMU on 
consolidating trust within the community members in Table 2. The trust in villagers are 
measured by four survey items: 1) most of the people living in the village can be trusted; 
2) villagers are willing to help you if needed; 3) villagers are not likely to take advantage 
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of you for their own sake; and 4) villagers generally trust each other in matters of lending 
and borrowing money. For each question, this paper conducts three models without 
controls, with controls and with controls and district fixed effects to check whether the 
estimates are biased by confounding factors. The aggregated level of trust in villagers is a 
composite index that merges all four of the indicators into one. As shown in columns (1) 
to (3) of Table 2, the SMU marginally reduces the general trust towards villagers at the 
10% of significance level while significantly increasing the trust in the matter of monetary 
transaction with 99% confidence. Though the trust toward villagers in the specified 
interaction is increased with the largest magnitude 0.4 standard deviation the aggregated 
level of trust in villagers are not statistically significant as shown in columns (13) to (15).
The trust in people outside of the village is measured by the level of trust in four 
groups: 1) local government officers, 2) central government officers, 3) other ethnic groups, 
and 4) strangers. The SMU was implemented in cooperation with government officers. 
Thus, in SMU, the villagers could increase their trust in government that was responsive 
and that delivered public goods. However, the results of Table 3 indicate that trust in local 
and central government is unchanged by the SMU. The impact of the SMU 
indistinguishable from zero is also found in trust in members other ethnic or religious 
group and in strangers.
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Table 2: Treatment Effect of SMU on within village trust













Treatment x Post -0.171* -0.166* -0.164* -0.052 -0.053 -0.043
(0.091) (0.088) (0.087) (0.110) (0.108) (0.106)
Treatment 0.047 0.003 0.018 0.030 0.028 0.002
(0.087) (0.082) (0.073) (0.096) (0.096) (0.083)
Post -0.034 -0.007 -0.019 0.022 0.041 0.019
(0.062) (0.064) (0.063) (0.078) (0.075) (0.076)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 5,170 5,153 5,153
R-squared 0.005 0.019 0.039 0.000 0.004 0.023













Treatment x Post 0.063 0.065 0.063 0.424*** 0.430*** 0.444***
(0.110) (0.108) (0.112) (0.138) (0.133) (0.135)
Treatment -0.093 -0.099 -0.123 -0.184* -0.213** -0.251**
(0.099) (0.098) (0.074) (0.107) (0.104) (0.103)
Post 0.277*** 0.250*** 0.264*** 0.043 -0.003 0.003
(0.084) (0.082) (0.084) (0.074) (0.071) (0.072)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 5,169 5,152 5,152
R-squared 0.022 0.028 0.056 0.025 0.035 0.060





Control & District fixed
(15)
Treatment x Post -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Treatment -0.002 -0.006 -0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Post 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 20,680 20,612 20,612
R-squared 0.002 0.004 0.007
Notes: The unit of observations is household. All outcome variables (except the aggregated level of trust in villagers) are 
measured 5 likert scales. The dependent variables in this table are all normalized with mean zero and standard 
deviation one in control villages. The included control variables are household age, gender, religion, ethnicity, marital 
status, education, land ownership and home ownership. There are seven districts where include 8-9 villages on 
average. In each district the control and treatment villages are evenly located. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
village level is in parentheses. Significantly different than zero is indicated at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90(*) percent 
confidence.
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Table 3: Treatment Effect of SMU on trust in people out of village
Trust in local government Trust in central government
No   control Control Control + Dist.fixed No control Control Control + Dist.fixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment x Post 0.128 0.123 0.130 -0.021 -0.024 -0.018
(0.129) (0.127) (0.128) (0.118) (0.117) (0.118)
Treatment -0.190 -0.192 -0.203* -0.054 -0.070 -0.057
(0.126) (0.128) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.090)
Post 0.002 0.031 0.005 0.265*** 0.290*** 0.271***
(0.081) (0.079) (0.080) (0.077) (0.080) (0.078)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 5,170 5,153 5,153
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.035 0.016 0.018 0.049
Trust in other identity groups Trust in strangers
No control Control Control   + Dist.fixed No control Control Control + Dist.fixed
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment  x Post -0.036 -0.024 -0.043 -0.008 0.009 0.011
(0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.081) (0.075) (0.073)
Treatment 0.151 0.076 0.120* 0.028 0.004 0.009
(0.103) (0.092) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.057)
Post 0.012 -0.014 0.010 -0.418*** -0.443*** -0.439***
(0.065) (0.062) (0.063) (0.060) (0.055) (0.054)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 5,170 5,153 5,153
R-squared 0.005 0.035 0.070 0.072 0.083 0.093
Normalized   composite index of trust in others
No   control Control Control   + Dist.fixed
(13) (14) (15)
Treatment x Post 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Treatment -0.004 -0.011 -0.008
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Post -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 20,680 20,612 20,612
R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.009
Notes: The unit of observations is household. All outcome variables (except the aggregated level of trust in villagers) are 
measured 5 likert scales. The dependent variables in this table are all normalized with mean zero and standard 
deviation one in control villages. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level is in parentheses. Significantly 
different than zero is indicated at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90(*) percent confidence.
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2 Self-Empowerment
We measure self-empowerment through three items: 1) how much control the 
respondent has in making decisions that affect everyday activities, 2) whether the 
respondent has the power to make important decisions, and 3) how much influence the 
respondent has in making this village a better place to live. Table 4 presents the treatment 
effect of SMU on self-empowerment. The results show that exposure to participatory 
experience raises the capacity of self-reliance, particularly the decisions about the village 
development projects. The SMU strengthens the self-help capacity of villagers by 0.29 
standard deviation, which is significant at the 1% level. The total level of 
self-empowerment also increased by 0.05 standard deviation at a significance level of 0.05.
Table 4: Treatment Effect of SMU on Self-Empowerment
Power to make decisions in my life Control to make decisions in my life
No control Control Control + Dist.fixed No control Control Control + Dist.fixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment   x Post -0.063 -0.063 -0.068 0.189 0.193 0.202
(0.101) (0.104) (0.104) (0.140) (0.133) (0.133)
Treatment -0.042 -0.064 -0.060 -0.001 0.004 -0.047
(0.089) (0.093) (0.068) (0.084) (0.093) (0.076)
Post 0.519*** 0.518*** 0.505*** -0.086 -0.086 -0.123
(0.067) (0.069) (0.071) (0.095) (0.093) (0.093)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 5,170 5,153 5,153
R-squared 0.045 0.058 0.087 0.003 0.028 0.073
Having Impact in making my village better Normalized   composite index of self-empowerment
No control Control Control + Dist.fixed No   control Control Control + Dist.fixed
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment x Post 0.274** 0.278** 0.290*** 0.044** 0.045** 0.047**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Treatment 0.052 0.036 0.015 0.001 -0.003 -0.010
(0.079) (0.084) (0.077) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016)
Post 0.235*** 0.249*** 0.232*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.068***
(0.080) (0.083) (0.083) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 15,510 15,459 15,459
R-squared 0.040 0.062 0.070 0.015 0.029 0.050
Notes: All outcome variables (except the aggregated level of self-empowerment) are measured 5 likert scales. The 
depen-dent variables in this table are all normalized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in control 
villages. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level is in parentheses. Significantly different than 
zero is indicated at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90(*) percent confidence.
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3. Collective action and Social Mobilization
The information about SMUs effect on collective action is obtained through four items: 
compared to the last 12 months, the following items have improved: 1) the respondents 
attitude to collective action, 2) other community members participation in collective action, 
3) the level of participation in collective action to solve community problems, and 4) the 
participation in helping community members in unfortunate situations. Table 5 shows that 
SMU does not have a direct and signifi-cant impact on motivating people to work for the 
common good. This is because the participation rate in community matters was initially 
very high at 67% among respondents, and 94% of others, 80% of participation rate to 
solve public problems and 92% to solve a community members prob-lem; thus, SMUs 
impact on collective action can be negligible due to the very small margin for 
improvement. Moreover, the baseline survey was conducted after the intervention so the 
initial urge to participate the community development activities was dampened as the 
implementation continued. These patterns are shown in columns (1) to (6). The negative 
effect of Post variable indicates that the participation in the first phase of intervention is 
statistically higher than in the second although the mean average of treatment village is 
larger by 0.14 0.2 standard deviation at the .05 statistical significance level.
In sum, most of the SMU effect on social capital is found in the self-empowerment 
dimension. The cornerstone of community-driven development is the active voluntary 
participation and the local trust within the village facilitates the mobilization of collective 
action. Thus, the trust in villagers and the level of collective action can determine the 
success of community-driven de-velopment, not the consequences. Thus, although the SMU 
effect on trust and collective action is statistically negligible, we can conclude that the 
SMU improves the capacity of villagers and empowers them to make their own voices 
heard and make their own choices.
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Table 5: Treatment Effect of SMU on Collective Action
Experience of Collective action for
Participating in collective action Community Improvement
No   control Control Control   + Dist.fixed No control Control Control + Dist.fixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment x Post -0.153* -0.150* -0.149* -0.134 -0.132 -0.129
(0.083) (0.078) (0.081) (0.116) (0.115) (0.116)
Treatment 0.190** 0.204** 0.143* 0.022 0.047 -0.003
(0.091) (0.087) (0.071) (0.114) (0.114) (0.083)
Post -0.393*** -0.400*** -0.394*** -0.163** -0.156* -0.184**
(0.055) (0.052) (0.053) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 5,170 5,153 5,153
R-squared 0.044 0.068 0.137 0.008 0.022 0.065
Collective action for Collective action for
Solving Community Problem Helping Community Members
No   control Control Control   + Dist.fixed No control Control Control + Dist.fixed
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment x Post -0.068 -0.058 -0.071 -0.135 -0.131 -0.129
(0.123) (0.121) (0.121) (0.117) (0.115) (0.115)
Treatment 0.193** 0.172* 0.196** 0.060 0.038 0.060
(0.089) (0.090) (0.082) (0.120) (0.120) (0.096)
Post 0.276*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.787*** 0.788*** 0.778***
(0.091) (0.090) (0.089) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065)
Observations 5,170 5,153 5,153 5,170 5,153 5,153
R-squared 0.015 0.021 0.035 0.155 0.157 0.184
Normalized   composite index of collective action
No control Control Control + District fixed effect
(13) (14) (15)
Treatment x Post -0.031 -0.030 -0.030
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Treatment 0.029* 0.029* 0.025
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Post 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 20,680 20,612 20,612
R-squared 0.002 0.009 0.016
Notes: All outcomes (except the aggregated level of collective action) in the raw dataset are dummy variables (0 
is No and 1 is Yes). The dependent variables in this table are all normalized with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1 in control villages. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level is in parentheses. 
Significantly different than zero is indicated at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90(*) percent confidence.
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Income Generation of Community and Household
In addition to the improvement of social capital, the other critical purpose of SMU is 
to increase income by creating a better community environment for economic activities. We 
evaluate the economic condition of community by examining living quality, the availability 
of employment, access to job training and the increase of agricultural production and sales. 
Moreover, we ask their average monthly income to assess the economic status of the 
respondents household.
Table 6 provides the result of treatment effect of SMU on income generation in the 
house-hold and the community. As indicated in columns (2) to (21), SMU impact on each 
category of income generation activities for community is not statistically different from 
zero. In contrast to community-income generation, SMU has little effect on increasing 
household income. The income effect of SMU solely goes to the participants of SMU, so 
these ambiguous effect of SMU on income generation could be caused by non-compliers 
who mitigate the average effect of treat-ment.
In contrast to the effect of the SMU on self-empowerment, the income generation 
effect of this project is only marginally significant at the household level. The SMU is 
proven to have no effect on the community-level income generation effect. To precisely 
measure noncompliance, we must estimate the treatment effect of SMU derived only from 
community-level participation.
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Distribution of Benefits
Distribution of Income Generation Benefit
In theoretical terms, a community-driven development project which is driven by local 
demand and based on the participation of community members should improve the match 
between what a community needs and what it obtains (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). However, 
meta-analyses of community-driven development projects reveal that wealthier and 
better-networked individuals dominate decision making while the vulnerable groups such as 
the poor, female, or ethnic minori-ties are systematically excluded from participation. 
Consequently, the dominant groups leaders, local elites or the rich shape the project to 
benefit themselves instead of distributing the benefits to the most deprived (Bardhan, 2000; 
Ibanez & Rao, 2003; Katz & Sara, 1997).
To check whether the SMU project distributes its benefits to people who need the 
most, we conduct heterogeneous analyses in six vulnerable groups: 1) the poor, 2) the 
female head of household, 3) the low educated, 4) ethnic minorities (non-Khmer), 5) 
religious minorities (non-Buddhist), and 6) the physically and mentally traumatized by Pol 
Pot regime.1)
The results of heterogeneous analyses present consistent patterns for each outcome. The 
ef-fect of SMU on self-empowerment is most pronounced in the vulnerable groups, as 
shown in panels A, B, D, E of columns (5) and (6) of Table 7. The magnitude of the 
SMU effect on self-empowerment is 0.02 to 0.2 standard deviations greater in the 
vulnerable groups such as the household of female head, non-Khmer and non-Buddhist. In 
contrast, the SMU causes the ad-verse effect on mobilizing collective action for the 
vulnerable groups. As better educated and richer households have fewer opportunity costs, 
the non-vulnerable groups are more likely to participate into collective action. Highly 
insecure jobs and the lack of time prevent deprived groups from joining the 
community-based development project. These exclusions from partici-pation might increase 
the possibility that the benefits from participation are disproportionately distributed. As 
presented in panels (A) to (E) of columns (11) and (12), the SMU increases house-hold 
income only when the households are richer, male-headed, more educated, and belong to a 
majority ethnic and religious group. This unequal distribution of material benefits of the 
SMU can be linked to the low participation rate of the vulnerable groups.
1) The methods that define households for each category are described in detail in the notes of Table 7.
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In addition to the conventional categories of vulnerability, this paper includes the 
households that have members who were mentally or physically harmed by the Pol Pot 
regime. Cambodias community-driven development project are attributable to the 
state-sponsored genocide of the 1970s. SMU should therefore investigate whether the 
trauma generates a differential impact. The severity of the trauma caused by the Pol Pot 
regime is divided into two categories. The ’low’ category of the trauma includes people 
whose severity is below the 75th percentile. The ’high’ category is for above the top 25th 
percentile. Panel E shows that the trauma of Pol Pot does not affect the distribution of 
benefits of the SMU. The most traumatized households receive the most community 
income generation benefits from the SMU though the effect is only marginally significant. 
Thus, from the heterogeneous analysis, it is hard to find that trauma from the Pol Pot 
regime has a detrimental effect on the benefits of SMU.
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of the SMU on social capital and economic outcomes 
in post-conflict Cambodia. CDD approaches of the SMU is particularly important in 
conflict-affected communities which enables local community to regain sense of social 
cohesion and to restore livelihood. From 2014 to 2018, the SMU implemented in 30 
villages in 3 Provinces to improve the livelihood of rural villages through income 
generation, capacity building, and living environment improvement activities, and strengthen 
social cohesion. 
According to our estimates, the SMU project significantly improves the capacity of self 
-empowerment. The households of treatment villagers have 0.04 standard deviation greater 
self-reliance in making decisions for their life and village. Considering the fairness of the 
distribution of benefits, this self-empowerment effect of SMU becomes even more 
remarkable since the effect is especially substantial in vulnerable groups such as 
low-income, less educated and ethnic and religious minority households. However, SMU 
has very limited impact on improving economic condition. Although the project slightly 
increases the household monthly income, the CDD project does not generate substantial 
changes in community-level economic conditions.
Our findings contribute to the debate about the importance of CDD in improving 
social cohesion and income generation in conflict-affected areas. They provide the evidence 
that CDD improves the self-empowerment of villagers, particularly the vulnerable groups. 
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Furthermore, our results suggest that to generate notable improvement in economic 
conditions, the SMU should be accompanied with active participation of villagers
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